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Abstract 
 
Using pseudo-panel microdata we show that pension generosity affects early retirement 
decisions. The changes in the average replacement rate and decreases in wealth accrual between 
1967 and 2004 have caused an increase in early retirement probabilities from 16% to 63%. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In many industrialized countries, declining fertility rates have already lead to a reduction of 
the active population aged 20 to 65, thereby exerting pressure on social security systems and, in 
particular, pension systems. Because of the importance of this topic, there is a growing body of 
literature that tries to assess the determinants of early retirement (see Blöndal and Scarpetta 1999, 
Johnson 2000, 2001, Duval, 2003). In addition to various workers‟ and job characteristics that 
may affect the decision to retire early, institutional factors such as the generosity of retirement 
schemes may equally play an important role. Traditional economic theory cannot unambiguously 
predict the impact of institutional differences in pension systems. However, relatively few 
empirical studies exist that take a look at these institutional factors. This research void is 
primarily due to the lack of international microdata which is necessary in order to control for 
individual as well as institutional characteristics. Thus, all past cross-national studies have 
analyzed labor market participation rates of older workers using aggregate country-level data 
(e.g. Blöndal and Scarpetta, 1999, Duval, 2003, Johnson 2000, 2001). Such studies, however, 
have a number of drawbacks, including unresolved endogeneity problems, small sample sizes and 
the inability to disentangle micro-level from aggregate-level effects, e.g., for income. On the 
other hand, existing micro-level studies, such as those carried out by and for the OECD in the late 
1990s or those collected in the 2
nd
 volume of Gruber and Wise (1999), focus on single country 
analyzes only, thus omitting the aspect of international comparisons and thereby generally unable 
to assess the impact of pension generosity on early retirement behavior.  
To remedy such shortcomings, in this study we analyze the institutional determinants of early 
retirement with a unique microdata set covering several European countries. We use data from 
the 2005 Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) which allows us to 
construct a pseudo-panel exploiting the variation in the interviewees‟ retirement dates. It is to our 
best knowledge the first study that assesses the effects of institutional factors on individuals‟ 
early retirement decisions in a cross-national way, using microdata that enable us to control for a 
variety of workers‟ characteristics.  
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2. Data and Methodology 
 
In this study, we use the 2005 cross-sectional SHARE data from a random sampling of 
22,000 persons over 50 years of age in 10 European countries (Austria, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland). Following the OECD 
(1995), we define retired persons as those that (1) self-assess their employment status as retired 
and (2) are factually out of the labor force. About half the respondents (10,600 persons) in the 
SHARE dataset assessed their current job situation as „being retired‟.  
We restrict the analysis to individuals that are older than the legal retirement age in their 
countries in 2004. About 7,000 retirees remain in the dataset, of which approximately 5,000 
retired early and 2,000 retired at the legal retirement age. We define an early retiree as a retired 
person who withdrew from the active labor force before the legal age of pension payment 
eligibility. The SHARE recall data on year of withdrawal allow the calculation of the 
respondent‟s age at the recorded year of retirement, while panel data on the legal retirement ages 
in the 10 countries from 1960 on was obtained from Blöndal and Scarpetta (1999) and Duval 
(2003). However, even though retirement decisions took place in different years between the 
observation period 1967 and 2004, each person is observed only once. Thus, the structure of our 
data gives rise to a European pseudo-panel; a set of repeated, but unbalanced cross-sections of 
micro-level information on retirement decisions of (presently) retired persons. Restriction of the 
sample to those beyond the legal retirement age in 2004 implies that the comparison group of the 
„early retirees‟ are the „regularly retired‟.1  
To investigate the institutional determinants of early retirement, we view the (conditional) 
probability of early retirement at time t as a function of (worker‟s) personal and job 
characteristics at the same time, as well as macroeconomic and institutional factors as they 
existed at that time. The 2005 SHARE data also includes recall information on the respondents‟ 
social and economic situation at the time of (early) retirement, namely gender, marital status, 
level of education (6 categories), type of employment (4 categories), hierarchical position (6 
categories), tenure, and firm size (7 categories). The macroeconomic factors include levels of and 
changes in unemployment rate and GDP per capita that account for a country‟s general economic 
condition. As institutional factors that describe the generosity of the pension system at the time of 
                                                 
1
 Non-restriction of the sample would have included the „still active in 2004‟ in the comparison group, some of 
which, however, might have retired early but after the year the survey was conducted. For such a sample, a survival 
analysis would have to be applied. 
  4 
retirement we employ the „average gross replacement rate‟ and the „decrease in pension wealth 
accrual‟, also called „implicit tax rate‟ on continued work, obtained from Blöndal and Scarpetta 
(1999) and Duval (2003), respectively. Thus, our variables of interest do not only vary between 
countries but also over time and are matched individually by the retirement date. The first 
variable approximates pension system generosity, while the second (and third) measure(s) the 
forgone growth in net pension income when continuing working. As all of these pension system 
indicators are calculated for an average, representative older worker, they reflect the general 
generosity in a given year rather than being perfectly individual-specific (see Table 1 for 
descriptive statistics and Table 2 for exact definitions).  
 
--Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here-- 
 
We estimate a standard Logit model, in which the dependent variable takes on the value „1‟ if 
the retired person withdrew early, and „0‟ otherwise. In some models, country fixed effects take 
account of time-invariant institutional features that might equally affect one‟s decision to retire 
early, such as engagement possibilities outside the labor force like civic political participation 
possibilities reflected by the openness of democratic institutions. We include the pension system 
variables jointly, except the case in which the generosity measures are both by Duval (2003). The 
latter being correlated with 0.73 in our sample, we also report regressions using one single 
institutional feature only.
2
 We estimate models with time fixed effects and, alternatively, a trend 
variable or country-specific time trends that allow for heterogeneity in the macroeconomic and 
institutional development. Clustering at the country-year level ensures that standard errors are 
corrected for within-group correlation (Moulton 1990).
3
  
 
 
3. Results 
 
The estimated impacts of pension generosity on the probability of retiring early are depicted 
in Table 3. Model 1 shows the results of a model that simply pools the data and does not include 
                                                 
2
 The quite high correlation is due to the fact that replacement rates play a role in calculating the implicit tax. 
3
 With merely 10 countries, clustering at the country level was not deemed feasible. The country-year level 
comprises all individuals with identical retirement year in the same country, amounting to up to 200 clusters.  
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any fixed effects. All subsequent models include country fixed effects, while model 2 adds time 
fixed effects, model 3 a linear time trend, and model 4 country-specific time trends.  
In all models with two generosity measures simultaneously employed, the inclusion of 
country and time fixed effects clearly improves the models‟ fits and significantly alters the effects 
of the coefficients compared to model 1: in models 2 to 4 both the average replacement rate as 
well as the decline in wealth accrual increase the probability of retiring early. The lower part of 
Table 3 corroborates these findings estimating regressions employing one institutional feature 
only, including the implicit tax rate measure from Duval (2003). This is in line with previous 
empirical analyses which report a more generous pension system and a higher implicit tax on 
continued employment to negatively impact labor force participation rates of older persons (e.g. 
Johnson, 2001, Duval, 2003). In the upper part of Table 3, the similarity of the sizes of the 
coefficients across models 2 to 4 suggests that how the variation over time is treated is not 
essential for the results. 
 
--Insert Table 3 about here-- 
 
In order to assess the institutional effects quantitatively, we report in the middle rows of 
Table 3 the predicted probabilities of early retirement for two time points: in the years 1967 and 
2004. Probabilities were calculated at the sample means and the corresponding values for average 
replacement rate (0.2 in 1967 and 0.44 in 2004) and decrease in wealth accrual (0.86 in 1967 and 
2.06 in 2004). Comparing the effects of the institutional settings of 1967 with 2004 allows us to 
assess the impact of the European pension system policies over the last 30 years. As can be seen, 
the predicted effect that increased pension generosity and decreased actuarial neutrality has on 
this probability is substantial: the early retirement inclination increases from approximately 16% 
in 1967 to 63% in 2004. We find no gender-specific difference. Exclusion of retirees before 
1990, who might bias the results due to „selection‟ out of the sample caused by health-related 
attrition, or use of the implicit tax rate measure by Duval (2003), equally reveal increases in early 
retirement probabilities between 1967 and 2004 by ca. 35 and 50 percentage points, respectively.  
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6. Conclusion 
 
The question of what determines early retirement has grown in importance as industrialized 
countries grapple with ageing populations and shrinking labor forces. In the face of such 
changing demographics, early withdrawal of employees and self-employed persons from the 
active labor force may affect both economic growth and the sustainability of social security 
systems. Our study is the first international microdata analysis that assesses the impact of 
pension system generosity and neutrality on individual early retirement decisions in 10 European 
countries between 1967 and 2004. It reveals that differences in pension benefit schemes have a 
very significant and large impact on the probability of early retirement. The changes in the 
average replacement rate and decrease in wealth accrual between 1967 and 2004 have caused an 
increase in the predicted early retirement propensity from approximately 16% in 1967 to 63% in 
2004. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 observations mean 
standard 
deviation minimum maximum 
      
Early retirement 4782 0.70 0.46 0 1 
Average replacement 
rate 4782 51.93 25.22 0 80 
Decrease in wealth 
accrual 4782 2.36 2.35 -0.80 7.9 
Implicit tax rate 5121 0.44 0.39 -0.05 1.05 
Notes: Descriptive statistics based on regression model 1, Table 3. 
 
Table 2: Definition of pension generosity variables 
Average replacement rate 
Expected gross replacement rate (over the next 5 years) at age 60 in 
regular retirement pension system, by which the last gross wage is 
translated into pension benefits. Values are averaged across six different 
civil status and wage levels (see Duval, 2003). For most countries, 
values from 1990–1999 and 2003 are available; for some, even earlier 
time series starting in the late 1960s. Values for 2004 have been 
replaced by values for 2003. Where applicable, missing values in all 
countries were replaced by linear interpolation. Data made available by 
courtesy of Mr. Duval, OECD (Duval, 2003). For Denmark and Greece, 
this information was unavailable. 
Decrease in wealth accrual  
Cumulated decrease in pension wealth accruals in year of retirement 
through postponing retirement from 55 to 65 years of age. Measured in 
1967 and 1995 for singles with an average wage (Table III.6, Blöndal 
and Scarpetta, 1999, p. 65.) For Greece (both years) and for Spain 
(1967), this information was unavailable. Missing values were replaced 
by linear interpolation, while from 1995 on, values for the year 1995 
were used. 
Implicit tax rate 
Average implicit tax on continued work for 5 more years (at retirement 
age of 60) in the old-age pension system. Measured as cumulated 
decrease in pension wealth accruals in year of retirement. For most 
countries, values from 1967–1999 are available. Values for 2000-2004 
have been replaced by values for 1999. Data made available by courtesy 
of Mr. Duval, OECD (Duval, 2003). For Denmark and Greece, this 
information was unavailable. 
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Table 3: The effect of pension generosity on the probability of early retirement 
  1 2 3 4 
  pooled   
country-specific 
trends  
Average replacement rate 0,004 0.047*** 0.042*** 0.045*** 
  (1.07) (3.25) (4.83) (3.57) 
Decrease in wealth accrual -0.137*** 0.805*** 0.925*** 0.960* 
  (3.86) (3.62) (4.75) (1.93) 
     
Observations 4782 4711 4782 4782 
Pseudo R
2
 0,1585 0,2351 0,2308 0,2433 
Wald test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Clusters 204 188 204 204 
Country fixed effects no yes yes yes 
Time fixed effects no yes no no 
Trend no no yes yes 
     
 Predicted early retirement probability 
  Full Sample  
- 1967 76% 18% 18% 16% 
- 2004 75% 64% 64% 63% 
  Women Only  
- 1967 79% 25% 15% 14% 
- 2004 75% 69% 68% 67% 
  Retirement after 1990  
Average replacement rate -.003 .067** .094*** .062+ 
  (0.92) (2.78) (3.80) (1.62) 
Decrease in wealth accrual -.031 1.120 2.054*** 1.127+ 
  (0.93) (1.28) (3.51) (1.37) 
- 1967 (out of sample) 69% 3% 0% 4% 
- 2004 66% 39% 24% 40% 
Alternative specifications: single institutions regressions 
Average replacement rate -0.001 0.016 0.042*** 0.045*** 
 (0.33) (1.62) (4.83) (3.57) 
Decrease in wealth accrual  -0.110*** 0.227 0.535** 1.196** 
 (3.72) (1.46) (2.99) (2.39) 
Implicit tax rate -0.221 -0.003 0.780*** 3.312*** 
 (1.26) (0.00) (4.01) (3.67) 
- 1967 (min = 0) 76% 75.75% 60% 44% 
- 2004 (max = 0.98) 72% 75.69% 68% 93% 
Note: ***, **,* significant at the 1%, 5% and 10%-levels, respectively. + indicates jointly significant at least at the 
5 percent level. Z-statistics in parentheses obtain through clustering at the country-year level. All models include 
changes and levels of GDP, changes and levels of unemployment rates, gender, marital status („married‟), level of 
education (6 categories), type of employment (4 categories), hierarchical position (6 categories), tenure and firm 
size (7 categories). Included countries: Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, 
Sweden, and Switzerland 
 
